This paper provides two representation theorems for time preferences. They both cover as special cases a variety of time preference models considered in the experimental and theoretical literatures on intertemporal choice. In particular, similarity relations on time and outcomes, exponential, quasi-hyperbolic and hyperbolic discounting are special cases of the theorems. This approach identi…es certain factors that are common to time preference structures which look so di¤erent.
Introduction
The theory of time preferences has recently been growing steadily with the contributions of two literatures. One of the lines of research has documented various types of anomalies that the standard theory of discounting fails to encompass. The better known of these anomalies is the time preference reversal: people tend to choose, for example, $100 now and not $110 tomorrow, and $110 in 31 days and not $100 in 30 days. Also relevant to the current paper are the observed violations of transitivity that arise due to the passage of time. The second line of research concerning time preferences is concerned with producing models that would fare better than the discounting model I am very grateful to Efe Ok for bringing this problem to my attention and for his comments. This work builds heavily on Masatlioglu and Ok (2004) and follows a suggestion in that paper to work on risky time preferences. I also thank Yusufcan Masatlioglu for his comments. in relation to one speci…c type of anomaly. Within this literature, one can …nd, among others, the works of Phelps and Pollak (1968) , Laibson (1997) and Rubinstein (2003) .
Until very recently there had been no attempts to produce a theory of time preferences that encompassed several of the observed violations. The work of Masatlioglu and Ok (2007) is the …rst attempt to produce a time preference model which:
(a) Encompasses the following anomalies: hyperbolic discounting, subadditive discounting and intransitivity of dynamic preferences (Roelofsma and Read, 2000) . This point is important since, as has been argued by Frederick, Lowenstein and O'Donoghue (2002) who reviewed this literature, one can not tell which model is more appropriate according to the experimental evidence. One must therefore allow for various kinds of time preferences.
(b) Encompasses the models of: time discounting (Samuelson (1937) , Koopmans (1960) , Fishburn and Rubinstein, 1982) , or quasi-hyperbolic discounting (Phelps and Pollak (1968) and
Laibson, 1997), more general hyperbolic discounting and time preferences based on similarity relations (Rubinstein 1998 (Rubinstein , 2003 . This point is important since producing a model which encompasses all these di¤erent models allows us to distinguish which features are common to all.
(c) Is suitable for applications.
(d) Is axiomatic.
The work of Masatlioglu and Ok (2004) considers only those time preferences that are de…ned on the prize-time space, just as in Fishburn and Rubinstein (1982) . Individuals must choose between dated bundles: bundle x in period t versus bundle y in period s: That is, neither paper considers preferences over streams of consumption bundles.
In this paper I address two shortcomings of the work of Masatlioglu and Ok (2007) while also maintaining literals a-d above. The two drawbacks I deal with in this paper are: their bundles are elements of open boxes of R n ; and they can not cope with the case where bundles are lotteries. I manage to obtain a representation similar to theirs for the case where the bundle space is a compact and connected separable space. The main advantage of extending their analysis to this realm is that my representation theorem can be used to study choices between lotteries. This is important since most economic problems involve some form of uncertainty or risk. Moreover, even though most "real" economic situations involving unknown prizes do not have known probabilities (i.e.
there is uncertainty as opposed to risk), the study of preferences over "risky prizes"-time space are relevant. First, representation theorems for this context can be viewed as a …rst step towards the more "relevant" Savage-type results, since the methods I use are quite simple. Second, most economic models in applied work involve von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences, and not those of Savage or Anscombe-Aumann. The reason for this is that they are simpler to work with. In this sense then, preferences over the "risky prize"-time space can be viewed as a tool for more applied researchers.
This paper is not a generalization of the work of Masatlioglu and Ok. Rather, I use a similar set of axioms, to obtain a similar result, in a di¤erent context. Some of my axioms are weaker, but I use a transitivity axiom that is stronger than theirs. Yet, my transitivity axiom is still (a lot)
weaker than standard transitivity. Finally, in this paper I do not discuss uniqueness, which was dealt with by Masatlioglu and Ok (2007) , or with applications of the model, since my model can also be used in all of their settings.
The Model and Axioms
Let X be a compact, separable connected topological space. The set of times is an interval T ,
Let D X T be the space of dated bundles. For each t 2 T; by the tth time projection of % D D, I mean the binary relation % t on X de…ned as x % t y i¤ (x; t) % (y; t):
The following de…nition introduces the main objects of the present analysis.
De…nitions. A binary relation % on D is said to be a time preference on D if it satis…es the following conditions:
(i) % is complete, i.e. 8 (x; t) ; (y; s) 2 D; (x; t) (y; s) or (y; s) (x; t)
(ii) % is continuous: Upper and Lower contour sets of are closed. 1 (iii) % 0 is transitive
All axioms are imposed on %, a time preference on D X T (A1) Time Discounting (TD) For any x; y; z 2 X and s; t; v 2 T; if v t then This axiom is standard, and just says that the passage of time is bad, or that bundles are good.
The following axiom is a "natural" complement to the previous one, and says that if for a given bundle one time period (later, say) is worse than another, the same is true for all bundles: the e¤ect of time does not depend on the speci…c bundle.
(A2) Orthogonality (O) For all x; y 2 X and s; t 2 T (x; t) (x; s) if and only if (y; t) (y; s):
If (x; t) (x; s) for some x 2 X; and t; s 2 T; we say that s and t are equivalent. Given
Orthogonality, if we say that s and t are equivalent, that does not depend on the choice of x used for comparison of the time periods. The following axiom is the main axiom of this paper. It will allow for the separation of the e¤ects of time and bundles in the preferences.
(A3) Irrelevance (I) For all w; x; y; z 2 X and r; s; t; v 2 T; r < s; t < v :
and (y; t) (z; v)
The reason why the axiom "should" be true, is that when it is true that (y; r) (z; s) and (y; t) (z; v) ; the individual deems the passage of time from r to s as "equivalent" to the passage of time from t to v: Then, when comparing bundles at times t and v; the individual can refer to his choices between r and s: It is a stability property of preferences: when we change the time periods, preferences don't change. Irrelevance is equivalent to the Separability axiom of Masatlioglu and Ok when 0 = t for all t (which they also assume). In their formulation the conclusion of the axiom is (w; r) (x; s) , (w; t) (x; v). The axiom is similar to hexagon the conditions usually used for the separation of preferences in the time-prize spaces, or for additive representations (see for example Debreu (1960), Karni and Safra (1998) , Fishburn and Rubinstein (1982) and Wakker, 1988 and 1989) . The Irrelevance axiom for time preferences is weaker (in the presence of Orthogonality), for example, than the formulation of Fishburn and Rubinstein: for all x; y 2 X and all s; t; s + ; t + 2 T; (x; t) (y; t + ) implies (x; s) (y; s + ) :
To see so, recall that in the presence of condition 0 = t for all t of time preferences, the Irrelevance axiom is equivalent to: for all w; x; y; z 2 X and r; s; t; v 2 T; r < s; t < v : (y; r) (z; s) and (y; t) (z; v)
Then, by the Fishburn Rubinstein condition we have (y; r) (z; s) ) (y; t) (z; t + s r) and then (y; t) (z; v) implies that (z; t + s r) (z; v), so that t + s r is equivalent to v: Then, (w; r) (x; s) implies by the Fishburn Rubinstein condition that (w; t) (x; t + s r) ; and since t + s r is equivalent to v; we obtain (w; t) (x; v) as was to be shown.
For the next axiom, we introduce the following notation: for any r; s; t such that r < s < t; if for all y and z; (y; r) (z; s) and (y; s) (z; t) hold, we write r j s j t: The notation emphasizes that the time period s is "midway" between r and t : the e¤ect of the passage of time from r to s when comparing (y; r) and (z; s) is equivalent to the e¤ect of the passage of time from s to t when comparing (y; s) and (z; t) :
(A4) Weak Time-Transitivity. The preference relation is transitive when restricted to all r; s and t such that r j s j t:
Just to clarify, the Weak Time-Transitivity axiom speci…es that for all r; s and t such that r j s j t; we have that (x; t 1 ) (y; t 2 ) (z; t 3 ) implies (x; t 1 ) (z; t 3 ) for all x; y; z 2 X and 3 The Two Theorems.
I now present my main result concerning dated bundles.
Theorem 1. Suppose X is a compact, connected and separable space. The binary relation % is a time preference that satis…es Time Discounting, Weak Time-Transitivity, Orthogonality and
Irrelevance i¤ there exist two continuous functions u : X ! R and f :
for all (x; t); (y; s) 2 X T; and f ( ; t) is increasing; f (s; t)+f (t; s) = 0; 2f (r; s) = f (r; t) whenever
The form of the representation in equation (1) is the same as in Masatlioglu and Ok (2004) .
More concretely, their prize space X is an open interval in R; and their preference relations satisfy their set of axioms if and only if there exists an increasing homeomorphism U : X ! R ++ and a continuous map :
by taking logarithms one can transform this expression into equation (1), and one can similarly transform representation (1) into that of Masatlioglu and Ok by exponentiating both sides of the inequality and letting U = e u and = e f :
The main di¤erences between the representation of Masatlioglu and Ok and mine lies in the conditions that must be satis…ed by the functions involved: Their theorem has two requirements on U and which ensure that:
(i) a long enough passage of time compensates for any "increase"in the quality of the bundle, since (1; s) = 0 for all s; that is, any bundle x at t = 1 is worse than any date bundle (y; s) :
(ii) there always exists bundles good enough (or bad enough) that will compensate for any passage of time, since U is a homeomorphism between X and R ++ ; for any dated bundle (y; s) and time t;
there exists x and x 0 such that (x; t) (y; s) (x 0 ; t) :
On the other hand, I have the requirement that 2f (r; s) = f (r; t) whenever f (r; s) = f (s; t) :
While this requirement will be satis…ed by all transitive and Weak Time transitive preferences, it may pose a problem in very speci…c instances of subadditive discounting. This restriction in the functional form of f re ‡ects the fact that if the passage of time from r to s has the same e¤ect as the passage of time from s to t; then the passage of time from r to t "should" be twice the e¤ect of the passage from r to s: 
Risk
We now turn to the representation of preferences over dated lotteries. Formally, let Z be a compact, connected, separable, metric space. We will let X denote the space of probability measures over Z; endowed with the topology of weak convergence. 2 For the representation of preferences over lotteries, we add the standard independence axiom. 2 Recall that, under this topology, a sequence of probability measures (pn) converges to p if and only if R X f dpn ! R X f dp for all continuous real valued functions in Z.
Independence. The preference relation 0 satis…es the standard independence axiom: for all x; y; z 2 X and 2 [0; 1] ; x 0 y implies x + (1 ) z 0 y + (1 ) z:
Although Independence has been criticized from the descriptive viewpoint, Expected Utility is still the single most used tool in choice with risky alternatives. Therefore, using the Independence axiom is thus a natural starting point in the development of the theory of time preferences over risky alternatives. Moreover, the proof of the following theorem, my main result for risky choice,
shows that there is no interaction between Independence and the other axioms. This implies that the present theory can be extended without di¢ culty to the encompass other standard models of risky choice. In the following Theorem, for a lottery x and a function v; E x v denotes the expected value of v; according to lottery x:
Theorem 2. The binary relation % is a time preference that satis…es Time Discounting, Weak
Time-Transitivity, Orthogonality, Irrelevance and Independence i¤ there exist three continuous
for all (x; t); (y; s) 2 X T; and f ( ; t) is increasing; f (s; t)+f (t; s) = 0; 2f (r; s) = f (r; t) whenever f (r; s) = f (s; t).
As a simple application of Theorem 2, one can replicate the results concerning Rubinstein
Bargaining in Masatlioglu and Ok, where the set A of all agreements to the bargaining problem is the set of all probability measures on [0,1] with …nite support. 3 In this case, if the agreement is reached then with probability (fag) player 1 will receive a; and player 2 receives 1 a:
4 Proofs 4.1 Proof of Theorem 1.
The basic idea of the proof is to de…ne f (0; ) ; and then use Irrelevance and f (0; ) to build f (t; )
for all other t: Before turning to the proof, let me …rst prove a lemma, about a new axiom, that will be useful in the sequel. such that (y; t) (z 0 ; q) : Then, Irrelevance, (y; r) (z 0 ; p) and (y; t) (z 0 ; q) imply that for all w and x; (w; r) (x; p) , (w; t) (x; q)
as was to be shown.
De…ning f (0; ) :
If for all t 2 T; (x; 0) (x; t) the problem is trivial, so assume that for some t; (x; 0) x; t :
Likewise, if for all x; y (x; 0) (y; 0) the problem is trivial, so assume that for some a 0 maximal x and minimal x; (x; 0) (x; 0) :
Step 1. Let t 0 = 0 and …x any t 1 such that for some x; (x; 0) (x; t 1 ) and (x; t 1 ) (x; 0) :One can easily show that since X is connected and separable, and is continuous, X ft 0 ; t 1 g is separable (there is a countable set Z X such that whenever (x; t) (y; s) for t; s 2 ft 0 ; t 1 g there is a z 2 Z such that (x; t) (z; r) (y; s) for r; t; s 2 ft 0 ; t 1 g) and that therefore, there exists a continuous U : X ft 0 ; t 1 g such that (x; t) (y; s) i¤ U (x; t) U (y; s) for all x; y in X and s; t 2 ft 0 ; t 1 g : The U function has the property that U (x; t 0 ) > U (x; t 1 ) for all x; so that if we let u U (x; t 0 ) and h (u) U (x; t 1 ) ; by the solution to the Abel functional equation
given in Kuczma's Theorem, (see Kuczma et al., 1990) we know that there exists a function g such that g (u) = g (h (u)) + constant. This means that there exists a u 1 : X ! R such that (x; t) (y; s) i¤ u 1 (x) u 1 (y) + f (t; s): Multiplying both sides by a constant one can normalize f (t 0 ; t 1 ) = f (t 1 ; t 0 ) = 1 and by subtracting a constant to u 1 one can normalize u 1 (x) = 1:
Step 2.We start this step with two Lemmas. Lemma 1. Suppose X is a compact, connected and separable space and that the binary relation % is a time preference. Fix any r; t 2 T such that r < t and (x; t) (x; r) : Then, there exists s such that r j s j t.
Proof. If t is equivalent to r; in the sense that (x; t) (x; r) for all x; there is nothing to prove, since all s 2 (r; t) are such that r j s j t: Therefore, suppose that (x; r) (x; t) for all x: Then, by continuity and connectedness of X and (x; t) (x; r) (x; t) there exists e x such that (x; r) (e x; t) :
Let [x; e x] fx : e x 0 x xg : De…ne the following two correspondences from [x; e x] to [r; t] : G 1 (x) = fs : (x; r) (x; s)g and G 2 (x) = fs : (x; s) (x; t)g :
That G 1 and G 2 are nonempty valued (i.e. well de…ned correspondences) follows from continuity and connectedness of X: We now show that G 1 has a closed graph (the proof for G 2 is analogous and omitted). Take any net (x ; s ) ! (x; s) in the graph of G; that is, (x; r) (x ; s ) for all :
Using continuity we obtain (x; r) (x; s) so that the graph is closed.
De…ne G = G 1 G 2 ; and recall that the lower inverse of G is de…ned by
Since r 2 G 1 (x) and t 2 G 2 (x) ; r t 2 G (x) ; so that G l ([r t; 0]) is nonempty. We also know that since G has a closed graph, G l ([r t; 0]) is closed. 4 Similarly, G l ([0; t r]) is nonempty and closed, so that connectedness of X ensures that there exists x such that 0 2 G (x ) ; which means that for some s; (x; r) (x ; s) and (x; s) (x ; t) as was to be shown.
Lemma 2. Suppose X is a compact, connected and separable space and that the binary relation % is a time preference that satis…es Time Discounting. For any x; y 2 X and r; t 2 T such that (x; r) (y; t) : Then, there exists w such that for r j s j t, (x; r) (w; s) (y; t) :
Proof. If (x; r) (y; s) (y; t), we are done and there is nothing to prove, so suppose (y; s) (x; r) (y; t). Since by Time Discounting we also have (x; r) (x; s) we obtain (y; s) (x; r) (x; s) : Since the sets U = fz : (z; s) (x; r)g and L = fz : (x; r) (z; s)g are nonempty and closed and X is connected, there must exist w such that (x; r) (w; s) as was to be shown. Then, we obtain
The converse (from utility to preference) is treated similarly. Also, we normalize u 2 (x) = 1:
Step 3. and hence,
Finally, it is also easy to show that .
We normalize u 3 (x) = 1:
Step n. One can continue in this fashion, and in Step n; …nd t 1 2 n 1 such that t 0 j t Also, one can …nd u n such that for k 2 n 1 ; (x; t 0 ) y; t k 2 n 1 if and only if
It is important to notice that the sequence t kn is increasing in k n : Also, we normalize u n (x) = 1 Taking Limits. In the next claim we will show that u n ! u for some continuous u : X ! R: We will now show that u represents preferences on X f0; tg for all t t 1 : Let = n t : 9k; n such that t = t k n o :
Take then any t t 1 and suppose (x; t 0 ) (y; t) : We have that for all t kn 2 ; with t kn t; (x; t 0 ) (y; t kn ) : Moreover, for some k;
That is, u represents preferences on 0; t for all t t 1 : With the procedure just described, one de…nes
Showing that u n ! u. Endow the space of continuous bounded functions on X with the sup norm. This is a complete metric space. We will show that the sequence fu n g is Cauchy, so that there exists a continuous u such that u n ! u. 
; and …x m n M: Since u n and u m represent 0 we have that u m = g u n for some increasing g:
is in the range of u n and of u n 1 2 n 1 : Then, for all k = 0; 1; :::; K; k is in the range of u n and of u n 1 2 n 1 and
Proof. We …rst show that K is well de…ned, and K 1. Since we have chosen a large enough n;
there exists x 1 such that (x 1 ; 0) x; t 1 2 n 1 , so that
Since u n (x) = 1; we obtain that 1 1 2 n 1 is in the range of u n and of u n 1 2 n 1 establishing that
We now show by induction that for all k K; k is in the range of u n and of u n 1 2 n 1 and that equation (2) is satis…ed.
For k = 0; equation (2) is satis…ed since we have normalized u n (x) = u m (x) = g (u n (x)) = 1;
and therefore we have g 1 (1) = 1: For k = 1; equation (2) is satis…ed because
and
Therefore, using equations (3) and (4) we obtain
Suppose now that we have shown that for some k 1 < K, 1 k 1 2 n 1 is in the range of u n and of u n 1 2 n 1 and that
We now show that 1 k 2 n 1 is in the range of u n and of u n 1 2 n 1 and that
Since 1 and 1 K 2 n 1 are in the range of u n and u n is continuous, 1 k 2 n 1 is also in the range of u n : Similarly, 1 
We obtain
as was to be shown. Take now any x 2 X: We will show that ju m (x) u n (x)j < "; proving that fu n g is Cauchy.
Two cases must be considered.
2 n 1 for some k K: Let y; z be such that
By Lemma 3, we know that
Therefore, we obtain
Let y be such that u n (y) = 1 K 2 n 1 (such a y exists by de…nition of K). By Lemma 3, we have
We now show that u m (x) u m (y) 
which would contradict the maximality of K: Then, x satis…es
which together with 1
Extending f (0; t) for t > t 1 : We will consider two types of t > t 1 : We will consider …rst a t > t 1 such that (x; t ) (x; 0) and then the case in which t is such that (x; 0) (x; t ) :
For any t > t 1 such that (x; t ) (x; 0) we de…ne, as in Steps 1-n a sequence of times s n such that 0 j s 1 j t and inductively 0 j s n j s n 1 : This de…nes an in…nite sequence of times s n ; since whenever t is not equivalent to 0; there exists s < t such that 0 j s j t 0 j s j t implies that s is not equivalent to 0 t is not equivalent to 0, since t 1 is not equivalent to 0: Lemma 4. The sequence fs n g converges to some s L which is equivalent to 0:
Proof. Since the fs n g sequence is decreasing, it must have a limit, so suppose that contrary to the statement of the lemma, s n ! s L with s L not equivalent to 0: Let x and y be such that (x; 0) (y; s 1 ) and (x; s 1 ) (y; t) ;
which exist by de…nition of s 0 : Let x n and y n be such that (x n ; 0) (y n ; s n+1 ) and (x n ; s n+1 ) (y n ; s n ) : Again, such x n and y n exist by de…nition of s n+1 : Since X is compact, we have that there exists convergent subsequences of x n and y n , x n k ! x L and y n k ! y L so that by continuity
Since s L is not equivalent to 0; we must have y L t x L for all time periods t:
We also have (x n ; s n+1 ) (y n ; s n ) for all n; so that by continuity, (
implies y L t x L for all time periods t; contradicting our previous assertion that y L t x L .
By Lemma 4 there exists an n such that s n 2 [0; t 1 ] ; and we thus let f (0; t ) = 2 n f (0; s n ) :
From Steps1-n we know that u and f (0; t ) represent preferences on X f0; t g :
We now consider the case in which t is such that (x; 0) (x; t ) : Since preferences are continuous one can …nd a maximal t such that (x; 0) x; t : Such a t has already been assigned an f 0; t : We now let f (0; t ) = f 0; t t + t: The structure of f beyond t doesn't really matter because all elements of X in 0 are strictly better than all elements of X in t :
De…ning f (t; s)
One can use irrelevance to …nd an r such that (x; 0) (y; r) , (x; t) (y; s) ; so that f (t; s) = f (0; r) :
4. 
for all (x; t); (y; s) 2 X T; and f ( ; t) is increasing; f (s; t) + f (t; s) = 0; 2f (r; s) = f (r; t) whenever f (r; s) = f (s; t). Step 1. From to R: Suppose is a time preference that satis…es TD, WTT, O and I.
R is a time preference. Completeness. For any (j; t) ; (k; s) 2 [0; 1] T there are x; y 2 X such that E x v = j and E y v = k; and since (x; t) (y; s) or (y; s) (x; t) must hold, by de…nition of R, we obtain that (j; t) R (k; s) or (k; s) R (j; t) must hold.
Continuity. Fix (j; t) 2 [0; 1] T and take any sequence (k n ; s n ) 2 [0; 1] T; with (k n ; s n ) ! (k; s)
and (k n ; s n ) R (j; t) for all n: We then have that (k n x + (1 k n ) x; s n ) ! (kx + (1 k) x; s) and (k n x + (1 k n ) x; s n ) (jx + (1 j) x; t) 9 > > = > > ; ) continuity of (kx + (1 k) x; s) (jx + (1 j) x; t) so that (k; s) R (j; t) : The case of the lower contour set is treated similarly.
Transitivity of R 0 . De…ne R 0 as jR 0 k i¤ (j; 0) R (k; 0) : Pick any j; k; l 2 [0; 1] such that jR 0 kR 0 l:
We then have R satis…es Time Discounting. De…ne P to be the strict part of R and I its indi¤erence: (j; t)P (k; s)
if and only if (j; t)R(k; s) and not (k; s)R(j; t); (j; t)I(k; s) i¤ (j; t)R(k; s) and (k; s) R (j; t) : Suppose j; k; l 2 [0; 1] and s; t; v 2 T; with v t and assume (j; t)P (k; s): We have that for some x and y; (x; t) (y; s) and since satis…es TD, (x; v) (y; s) ; so that (j; v)P (k; s): The case of (j; t)R(k; s)
is treated similarly, establishing that R satis…es TD.
R satis…es Orthogonality. Take j; k 2 [0; 1] and s; t 2 T and x; y such that E x v = j; E y v = k: Then since satis…es Orthogonality, (j; t) R (j; s) , (x; t) (x; s) , (y; t) (y; s) , (k; t) R (k; s) :
R satis…es Irrelevance. For all i; j; k; l 2 [0; 1] …nd w; x; y; z 2 X such that E w v = i; E x v = j; E y v = k and E z v = l: Let r; s; t; v 2 T; r < s; t < v : (k; r) I (l; s) and (k; t)I (l; v) ) (y; r) (z; s) and (y; t) (z; v) ) (w; r) (x; s) , (w; t) (x; v) and 8p 2 [r; s] 9 q 2 [t; v] such that (w; r) (x; p) , (w; t) (x; q) ) (i; r) R (j; s) , (i; t) R (j; v) and 8p 2 [r; s] 9 q 2 [t; v] such that (i; r) R (j; p) , (i; t) R (j; q) so that R satis…es Irrelevance.
Step 2. From R to : The proof is analogous and is omitted, so the proof of the Lemma is complete.
